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Westphalia and the Taiwan Conundrum: 
Beyond an Exclusionist Construction of Identity 
·and Sovereignty 
Chengxin Pan 
(School of International and Political Studies, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin 
University) 
Introduction 
Sino-American relations, widely believed to be the most important global 
bilateral relationship in the twenty-first century, will have a profound impact on 
international security in the Asia Pacific and beyond. In this crucial and complex 
bilateral relationship, no issues seem more potentially explosive than the question of 
Taiwan. For China, this issue strikes at the heart of its national sovereignty, while for 
the United States, keeping its commitment to Taiwan's defence against a potential 
Chinese military attack amounts to a litmus test of its strategic credibility. Given what 
is at stake here for both the United States and China, it is not surprising that the 
Taiwan issue has frequently been at the centre of a series ofU.S.-China confrontations, 
notably the Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the 2001 spy plane incident, as well as U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan. 
Moreover, the Taiwan question not only has security implications for Sino-
American relations, but also has profound political, economic, social, and cultural 
repercussions for China and Taiwan itself. At the same time, with mainland China and 
Taiwan serving as the linchpins of the regional production networks in East Asia, the 
Taiwan issue, if improperly handled, could also have an immediate devastating effect 
on regional stability and prosperity. 
Given the importance of the Taiwan question for Sino-American relations, 
regional and international security as well as the wellbeing of mainland China and 
Taiwan, it is essential that we seek to better understand the causes of and possible 
solutions to this long-running conundrum. For this reason, this paper both joins and 
builds on a growing list of literature that has shed much light on the question of 
Taiwan. But in so doing, the paper aims to engage with the Taiwan question through a 
hitherto little explored approach, namely, a critical appraisal of the Westphalian 
concept of sovereignty in the context of cross-strait relations. 
The adoption of this approach is prompted by a two-pronged gap in the literature 
on Taiwan and sovereignty. On the one hand, the Taiwan question has been the 
subject of numerous research articles and books, but the conventional approaches so 
far have not focused explicitly on the ideational and constitutive role of Westphalian 
sovereignty in the Taiwan conundrum, nor on the possibility of solving this problem 
through an alternative conception of sovereignty. For example, some works on 
Taiwan are centred on historical contexts of the development of cross-strait relations;1 
others discuss the Taiwan question mainly in the geopolitical settings of the strategic 
1 See for ex.ample, Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: US.-Taiwan Relations since 1942, Annonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 
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triangle of Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. 2 Still others focus on the issues of 
nationalism and identity politics and economic and political differences. 3 History, 
strategic triangle, identity politics, and economic and political differences are no 
doubt part and parcel of the Taiwan question and should be taken seriously, but these 
factors alone do not provide adequate explanations of the intractability of the Taiwan 
issue. In this sense, it is puzzling that little systematic attempt has been made to 
examine how the belief in the Westphalian notion of sovereignty shared by both sides 
may play a part in this problem. It is true that there have been som~ analyses of the 
Taiwan question through a perspective of sovereignty. 4 For example, Michel 
Oksenberg usefully discussed how 'the concept of sovereignty and its associated ideas 
are confining' in relation to cross-strait relations as both sides cling to the notion of 
sovereignty as they understand it. Nevertheless, he seemed to suggest that the major 
constraints o~ the Taiwan question are 'deep distrust and animosity between the two 
and their different undei;standings of the meaning of sovereignty. ' 5 In this way, Qie 
. . 
link between their common ideational affiliation with the Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty and the Taiwan conundrum remains largely obscured. 
If scholars on the Taiwan question have ye,t to systematically problematise the 
issue of sovereignty, then international relations scholars have also made little attempt 
to bring their critical understanding of sovereignty to bear on the issue of Taiwan. 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a large body of critical literature on the 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty. 6 These theoretical critiques of Westphalian 
sovereignty are highly valuable in that they lay the theoretical groundwork for 
2 See, for example, Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005; Tunsj0 0ystein, US Taiwan Policy: Constructing 
the Triangle, London: Routledge, 2008; and Nancy BemkopfTucker ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-
Taiwan~China Crisis, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 
3 See, for example, Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status 
in International Society, New York: Routledge, 1997; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Beijing's Security 
Behavior in the Asia Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?" in J. J. Suh et al eds., Rethinking Security 
in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004; Hsueh 
Hua-yuan, Tai Pao-tsun, and Chow Mei-li (2005)Js Taiwan Chinese: A History of Taiwanese 
Nationality, Taipei: Taiwan Advocates, 2005; David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in 
East Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007; and Gordon C. K. Cheung, China Factors: 
Political Perspectives & Economic Interactions, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007. 
4 See for example, Robert Madsen, 'The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan,' in 
Stephen D. Krasner ed., Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 141-93; Michel Oksenberg, 'The Issue of Sovereignty in 
the Asian Historical Context,' in Stephen D. Krasner ed., Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules 
and Political Possibilities, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 83- 104. 
5 Oksenberg, 'The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context,' pp. 99-IOl (emphasis added). 
6 See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the 
Anarchy Problematique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 17, no. 2 (1988), pp. 227-62; 
R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993; Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge: Polity, 1998; and Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organi.zedHypocrisy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
reconceptualising sovereignty in different ways and for 'opening up the possibility for 
new political actors to enter the global stage.''7 Indeed, this paper, with its specific 
focus on Taiwan, very much shares the broad research questions raised by Stephen 
Krasner in his edited volume Problematic Sovereignty: 'to what extent do existing 
institutional arrangements, rules, and principles associated with the concept of 
sovereignty inhibit the solution to some of the most pressing issues in the 
contemporary international order? Can these rules be bent? Can they be ignored? Do 
they present an insurmountable or at least significant barrier to _stable solution, or can 
alternative arrangements be created? '8 
In this broad genre of critical scholarship on sovereignty, some scholars have 
usefully demonstrated how diplomacy, conducted between mutually exclusive 
sovereignties, represents a fundamental process of mutual estrangement rather than 
mutual accommodation.9 Others have empirically and fruitfully examined how this 
particular concept has been linked to the political violence in multi-ethnic states such 
as the former Yugoslavia and how it has underpinned (or obstructed) international 
intervention and responses to such violence.10 And yet, this body of critical literature 
on sovereignty has yet to be more systematically applied to the analysis of the Taiwan 
question. Even mainland Chinese scholars with an interest in post-Westphalian 
sovereignty have shied away-perhaps understandably-from linking their analysis to 
the question ofTaiwan.11 
It is at this junction of mutual neglect between the literature on Taiwan and the 
critical scholarship on sovereignty that this paper aims to fill a gap by critically 
examining the central role of important ideas such as Westphalian sovereignty in 
shaping the dynamics of cross-strait relations. The paper consists of four parts. First, it 
will briefly discuss the key characteristics of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty. 
Second, it then illustrates how both mainland China and Taiwan's constructions of 
their national identity in regard to Taiwan are predicated on this model of sovereignty. 
7 Christopher L Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch, "Politics without Sovereignty?" 
in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch eds., Politics without 
Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations, London: UCL Press, 2007, p. 20 
[20-38]. • 
8 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Problematic Sovereignty,' in Stephen D. Krasner ed., Problematic Sovereignty: 
Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 1 [1-23]. 
9 James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. 
10 See for example, Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno eds., Beyond Westphalia? State 
Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; 
David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998; and Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and 
Politics of International Statebuilding, Ox.ford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
11 See for example, Chen Yugang and Yuan Jianhua eds. Chaoyue Weisitefaliya: 21 shifi guojiguanxi 
dejiedu (Beyond Westphalia? Interpretations of International Relations in the 21•t Century), Beijing: 
Shishi chubanshe, 2004. 
Next, it will discuss how this common ideational fixation with Westphalian 
sovereignty paradoxically widens differences between mainland China and Taiwan 
and exacerbates their mistrust and animosity. Finally, the paper indicates the need to 
go beyond the Westphalian model and the possibility of seeking alternative ways of 
conceptualising sovereignty in the construction of national identity across the Taiwan 
Strait. 
The Westphalian Model of Sovereignty 
To understand how the Westphalian model of sovereignty has dominated the 
thinking of both mainland China and Taiwan in relation to national identity and 
sovereignty, it is necessary to briefly consider what Westphalian sovereignty means. 
The Westphalian model of sovereignty owes its name to the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, which formally accorded·the states with the legal status of sovereignty, or the 
absolute authority over all internal matters within their own territories. Like most 
concepts in social sciences, Westphalian sovereignty is a fuzzy and frequently 
contested concept. As Richard Falk notes, 'the Westphalian rubric is ambiguous in its 
usage as it serves both as a shorthand to designate a state-centric, sovereignty-oriented, 
territorially bounded global order and to identify a hierarchically structured world 
order shaped and managed by dominant or hegemonic political actors. In effect, the 
term "Westphalia" contains an inevitable degree of incoherence by combining the 
territorial/juridical logic of equality with the geopolitical/hegemonic logic of 
inequality.' 12 But the confusion does not end there. As Falk continues, "'Westphalia" 
is simultaneously used to identify an event, an idea, a process, and a normative score 
sheet.' 13 
For the purpose of this paper, I shall focus on Westphalian sovereignty as an idea, 
one which addresses 1he interrelated questions of on what basis world order should be 
established and how political entities within it should be organised internally and 
related externally. In this sense, Westphalian sovereignty is better seen as a particular 
set of ideas rather than just one singular idea. When analysts invoke this notion, they 
often refer to different components of this ideational set. Having said that, the 
ideational complexities of Westphalian sovereignty should not detain us here, and in 
its conventional usage, it is still able to denote a common, relatively coherent 
understanding, or a way of thinking which not only has been generally accepted in the 
international community as a norm, but also has been institutionalised in a wide range 
12 Richard Falk, 'Revisitil1g Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia,' The Journal of Ethics, 2002, p. 
312. 
i~ Ibid, p. 312. 
of international organised and legal principles. When I refer to the notion of 
Westphalian sovereignty held by mainland China and Taiwan, which have been part 
of this international normative, legal, and institutional system, I mean precisely this 
particular understanding. 
This common understanding of Westphalian sovereignty has three levels of 
meaning. First, Westphalian sovereignty stipulates that world order should be based 
on a system that consists of sovereign, territorial states. Only such fully sovereign 
states should be qualified for full membership and participation in international 
organisations and international society more generally. For this reason, a Westphalian 
world order is also regarded as a statist system. Second, relations among sovereign 
states, as Westphalian sovereignty envisions, talce place in the context of anarchy, 
which means that there is no higher authority above sovereign states. And with this 
meaning come the norms of sovereign equality and nonintervention. In other words, 
as far as state authority is concerned) it is legally equal and mutually exclusive. And 
because traditionally state authority is exercised through and within territorial space, 
sovereign equality and nonintervention are often embodied in another closely linked 
norm: territorial integrity and exclusivity. The third level of meaning relates to the 
domestic context. Here, Westphalian sovereignty means that there is always one 
single supreme authority) the sovereign. This is what the French thinker Jean Bodin 
means when he suggests that 'majestas est summa in cives ac subditos legisbusque 
soluta potestas' [Sovereignty is supreme power over citizens and subjugated peoples 
and is bound by no law]. 14 
For centuries since the Treaty of Westphalia, the Westphalian model of 
sovereignty has gradually emerged as arguably the most fundamental concept of the 
modern international system. The dominance of Westphalian sovereignty is due less 
to the fact that it reflects the inherent reality of the world, than to the fact that states, 
organised on the basis of Westphalian sovereignty, are very often more efficient and 
thus more powerful, than alternative forms of governance such as non-territorial 
feudal societies, city-leagues, city-states, and loosely integrated empires. And in the 
context of constant war and its demand on manpower and other resources, it 1s 
obvious that efficiency often means the difference between survival and surrender. 
The success of W estphalian states, together with the norm of social Darwinism, 
further encouraged states to expand their territories. It is not pure coincidence that it 
was Europe that became the primary source of imperial and colonial expansion in the 
past few centuries. As European states, modelled on the Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty, cracked open traditional societies in the non-European parts of the world, 
14 Quoted in Northedge, International Political Systems, 1976, p. 56. 
the 'sovereignty' of those societies was effectively lost. But with a twist of irony, the 
idea of Westphalian sovereignty began to take roots, an idea which eventually led to 
decolonisation and national independence movement. Through this process of global 
normative replication, the Westphalian model of sovereignty becomes the established 
norm of the international system which is extensively institutionalised, for example, 
through the United Nations system.15 
Of course, in practice Westphalian sovereignty has far from been fully realised 
. 
everywhere, and this can be exemplified precisely by the question of Taiwan. And yet, 
precisely because the Taiwan issue is considered an exception to the rule, when it 
comes to tackling the Taiwan question, Westphalian sovereignty has become all the 
more pertinent and appealing to both mainland China and Taiwan. For all their 
political and ideological differences, this is probably one of the few major political 
ideas to which both sides passionately subscribe. It is this ideational commonality 
between mainland China and Taiwan to ·which the next section now turns. 
Westphalian Sovereignty and Common Constructions of National 
Identity across the Taiwan Strait 
Much has been said about the differences m national identity construction 
between mainland China and Taiwan. For example, mainland China and Taiwan have 
different focuses in national identity construction. For maninland China, the emphasis 
is on sameness between itself and Taiwan, with the latter considered to be both 
ethnically and culturally similar to the motherland and "an essential element of 
[China's] national identity." 16 Taiwan, by contrast, has increasingly highlighted its 
difference or distinctiveness, with mainland China classified as the significant Other. 
As Tu Wei-ming puts it, "Taiwaneseness is often set against Chineseness" and a new 
Taiwanese identity is largely conditioned on "de-Sinicization."17 
Differences also exist in the practical purposes of identity politics across the 
Taiwan Strait. Chinese identity politics in regard to Taiwan is designed to prevent the 
current Chinese national identity from unravelling. If Taiwan was allowed 
independence, other parts of China such as Tibet, Xinjiang and even Inner Mongolia 
might be encouraged to follow suit. A domino-style disintegration of China would 
thus ensue, putting the very legitimacy and survival of the Chinese government at risk. 
For .example, if China's 2005 Anti-Secession Law can be seen as part of this national 
15 Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 92. 
16 David Kang, op cit, p. 177. 
17 Tu Wei-ming, "Culhrral Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan," 11ie 
China Quarterly, p. 1117. 
identity construction process, it illustrates that this construction is more conservative 
in nature. According to Yu Keli, a Taiwan expert at 'the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, the law "would address only China's reaction if Taiwan declared statehood, 
rather than requiring active steps by the mainland to force reunification." 18 In this 
respect, Andrew Nathan suggests that China's aim "is not positive (to impose any 
particular system on Taiwan), but negative (to deny Taiwan to others)."19 By contrast, 
Taiwan's identity politics is more assertive and positive. It seeks to assert a new 
independent identity in order, among other things, to better suit the growth of 
Taiwan's democracy. Thus, the identity politics of mainland China and Taiwan seems 
to be on a collision course. But what is responsible for this collision course, as shall 
be illustrated below, is to a large degree their shared belief in Westphalian sovereignty 
as the ultimate organising principle of national identity. 
Sovereignty in China's Discourses of Taiwan 
In the global rush to replicate the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, China 
stands out as one of its most enthusiastic proponents. Alastair Iain Johnston argues 
that 'China's version of sovereignty comes closer than most to the Westphalian 
model.' 20 Similarly, Samuel Kim observes that the Westphalian notion of sovereignty 
'remains at the core of Chinese foreign policy thinking.' 21 In a way, Chinese 
adherence to Westphalian sovereignty is hardly surprising. With its experience of 
humiliation at the hands of imperial powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the concept of sovereignty looked most promising "as the solution to this 
weakness." 22 Even at a personal level, it is argued that the notion of sovereignty 
helped Chinese premier Zhou Enlai 'avoid the sense of inferiority stemming from the 
breakdown of cultural confidence in China. ' 23 
In this context, in the eyes of the Chinese, Taiwan's continued separation from 
the mainland remains characteristic of China's past national weakness and inferiority 
in the family of nations. Like the British-ruled Hong Kong and the Portuguese colony 
Macau, Taiwan was once a colony occupied by imperial Japan when China suffered 
18 Quoted in Joseph Kahn, "China's Anny May Respond if Taiwan Fully Secedes," New York Times, 
December 18, 2004. 
19 Andrew Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," The China Journal p. 88. 
20 Alastair Iain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel Kim ed., 
China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, Westview Press, 1998, p. 73. 
21 Samuel S. Kim, China In and Out of the Changing World Order, Center of International Studies 
World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 21, Princeton University, 1991, p. 18-19. 
22 Alastair Iain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim ed., 
China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, 4th ed., Boulder, CO: 
WestviewPress, 1998, p. 74. 
23 Shih, Navigating Sovereignty, p. 40. 
from both internal calamity and external encroachment. With the sovereignty over 
Hong Kong and Macau now reverted to China, Taiwan stands as the last but all the 
more pointed reminder of that humiliating past.24 As Zhu De, founder of the People's 
Liberation Anny, once claimed, "As long as Taiwan is not liberated, the Chinese 
people's historical humiliation is not washed away."25 Thus understood, little wonder 
that the Chinese government perceives the Taiwan question as a matter of national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and resorts to sovereignty as its solution to redress 
past wrongs. For example, in a 1997 interview with Asian Affairs,. then Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin said that "You have here a case where the fundamental 
interests of a nation lie. On such a question involving state sovereignty, a government 
has no room for any compromise."26 
The sovereignty solution to Taiwan is commonly known as the "One China" 
principle, which is couched in classic Westphalian tenns. For example, in the 2000 
State Council White Paper· The One-:China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, this 
principle is justified on the basis that "state sovereignty is inseparable. The territory is 
the space in which a state exercises its sovereignty. In the territory of a country there 
can only be a central government exercising sovereignty on behalf of the state.'.27 
Consequently, it argues that "Although the two sides of the Straits have not been 
reunified, Taiwan's status as a part of Chinese territory has never changed, neither, 
therefore, has China's sovereignty over Taiwan ever changed."28 
Indeed, not only is Taiwan considered a matter of sovereignty for China, China's 
sovereignty as a whole is seen as hinging on the fate of Taiwan. From the Chinese 
perspective, Taiwan is a litmus test for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Chinese state. It becomes, as it were, at once the last remaining sovereignty issue for 
China and the first line of defence of contemporary Chinese sovereignty and identity. 
As mentioned before, it is believed that Taiwan's independence would set a dangerous 
precedent for other peripheral areas of China, which could put Chinese sovereignty in 
jeopardy. In this sense, Taiwan and Chinese sovereignty have become almost 
synonymous. 
24 Chih-yu Shih (1998) 'A Postcolonial Reading of the State Question in China,' Journal of 
Contemporary China 7(17), pp. 125-139. 
25 Quoted in Denny Roy, "Tension in the Taiwan Strait," Survival, p. 79. 
26 Quoted in Greg Austin, "China's Perceptions of Cross-Strait Relations," p. 7. 
27 The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. 
2& The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. 
Taiwan's Evolving Perceptions of Sovereignty 
While mainland China sees issue of Taiwan largely through the Westphalian lens 
of sovereignty, it is interesting to note that there also exists a mirror-image discourse 
in Taiwan. In the past two decades or so, the Taiwan authorities have increasingly cast 
the issue in essentially the same political discourses. Prior to 1988, under the rule of 
Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the Kuomingtang (KMT) 
government in Taiwan had claimed sovereignty over mainland China as well as 
Taiwan. While Taipei and Beijing bitterly clashed over who was the sole legitimate 
government of China, neither side challenged the "one China" principle or China's 
sovereignty over Taiwan. Reflecting this cross-strait consensus, in the 1972 Shanghai 
Communique, the U.S. "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." 
This cross-strait consensus, however, became gradually eroded with the passing 
of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 and the end of martial law on Taiwan in 1991. In the 
same year, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui initiated a constitutional change, 
abandoning the claim that the Republic of China (ROC) represented the only 
legitimate government of China. The PRC was no longer viewed as a 'rebel group', 
but as an equal "political entity''.29 While this might be a realistic and conciliatory 
move on the part of Lee Teng-hui to recognise the existing political reality, it is at the 
same time a significant new development in the Taiwan conundrum. Previously both 
sides recognised that there was one China and Taiwan was an integral part of Chinese 
sovereignty, but thereafter, as reflected in the tenn 'ROC on Taiwan' popularised by 
Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan has repeatedly claimed sovereign status of its own. 
In order to demonstrate and promote this claimed status, for much of the 1990s 
and the first decade of the twenty-first century, Taiwan has conducted flexible 
diplomacy, vacation diplomacy, and cheque-book diplomacy. It has made a series of 
attempts to join the United Nations and other international organisations where 
statehood is a requirement for membership. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui dropped a 
political bombshell across the Taiwan Strait by saying that relations between China 
and Taiwan should ~e considered a "special state-to-state relationship." While Lee did 
not call Taiwan an independent, sovereign state outright, his reference to Taiwan's 
sovereignty was nevertheless unmistakeable. In August 2002, following in the 
footsteps of Lee Teng-hui's "two-state theory," his successor Chen Shui-bian claimed 
that China and Taiwan "are two separate countries on opposite sides of the Taiwan 
Strait." Chen's passion for Taiwan's sovereignty reflects one of the key political 
29 Chi Su, "Driving Forces Behind Taiwan's Mainland Policy," in Steve Tsang ed., Peace and Security 
Across the Taiwan Strait, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 45 (45-76]. 
'} 
platforms of his Democratic Progressive Party. Prominently titled "The Establishment 
of a Sovereign and Independent Republic of Taiwan," Section A of the DPP's 
political Platform contains the so-called 'Independent Clause', which states that: 
In accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, an independent country should 
be established and a new constitution drawn up in order to make the legal system 
conform to the social reality in Taiwan and in order to return. to the international 
community according to the principles of international law. 30 
Furthermore, in August 2005 Chen announced "One Principle, Three Insistences, 
and Five Oppositions." The 'one principle\ according to Chen, "is to protect 
Taiwan's sovereignty and negotiate with China under the principle of democracy, 
equity and peace."31 In Taiwan's first national security report issued in May 2006, 
sovereignty once again figures prominently. For example, in the section "Establishing 
a Reciprocal Framework for Peace and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations," the report 
states that "Taiwan's long-term national development strategic objectives at present 
are sovereignty and dignity, survival and security, and prosperity and development," 
with maintaining sovereignty being the "bottom line."32 And in laying out several 
conditions for establishing possible political relations with the mainland, such as 
reciprocal recognition of each other's judicial authority in its O\VIl territory, non-
interference of each other's foreign affairs and member issues in international 
organisations,33 its fondness of Westphalian sovereignty is all too obvious. 
The explicit appeal to Westphalian sovereignty is central not only to the official 
discourse of Taiwanese identity, but also to Taiwan's popular self-image. As Robert 
Ross points out, "after Taiwan's half century of autonomy, economic progress, and 
democratization, and the resulting contrast between Taiwan and authoritarian China, 
many on the island have developed a strong sense of 'Taiwan identity,' and they 
believe that Taiwan now merits international recognition as a sovereign country."34 
Likewise, Andrew Nathan notes that: 
30 Quoted in Quansheng Zhao, 'Beijing's dilemma with Taiwan: war or peace?" p. 221. 
31 
"Chen Updates Cross-Strait 'Guidelines,"' Taipei Times, August 7, 2005, 
<http://taiwansecurity.org/TT /200 SITT-070805 .htm>. 
32 National Security Council, 2006 National Security Report, Taiwan, 20 May 2006, p. 147. 
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/download/2006nsreport.pdf, 9 July 2006 
33 Ibid, p. 142. 
34 Robert Ross, "Taiwan's Fading fadependence Movement," Foreign Affairs, 85, no. 2 (2006), p. 142. 
10 
Policymakers need to understand the intense pride of the Taiwanese in their identity 
and in their accomplishments, their sense of entitlement to nationhood, and their 
commitment to keeping something they think they already have, their own state .... 
While not provided for in the U.S.-China "communique framework," this sense of 
nationhood is real. 35 
To the extent that both mainland China and Taiwan resort to the notion of 
sovereignty in their constructions of national identity, it is clear that the two sides 
have more in common than either side cares to acknowledge. If the ROC's 
sovereignty claim to the whole Chinese territory had been "a hopelessly unrealistic 
military fantasy,"36 its revised sovereignty claim to Taiwan now seems much more 
achievable. But the problem is that the two sides' sovereignty claims no longer 
coincide in territorial terms, but overlap with each other. 
To be sure, since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan, the Taiwan authorities 
have turned down the sovereignty rhetoric. In December 2008, Ma revoked Lee Teng-
hui's 'state-to-state relationship' remark on cross-strait relations at a forum on 
constitutional interpretation. Instead, he referred to the ROC Constitution by 
suggesting that the relations should be characterised as 'region-to-region.' 37 While 
this may be a departure from the DPP position on Taiwan's sovereignty, this new 
position has not departed from the Westphalian model of national identity 
construction, as under this formula, the ROC on Taiwan claims sovereignty over 
China as a whole and therefore implicitly denies the sovereignty of the PRC over the 
mainland. Furthermore, the pressure from the opposition and the momentum of 
democratisation in Taiwan will likely continue to .act as additional constraints on the 
Ma administration as far as Taiwan's sovereignty is concerned. 
Westphalian Sovereignty and a Potential Taiwan Conflict 
It is now clear that the issue of sovereignty is at the core of both China and-
Taiwan's constructions of identity in relation to Taiwan. But in what ways does this 
common belief in Westphalian sovereignty have to do with the long-standing Taiwan 
conundrum? In orcfer to address this question, firstly I want to briefly look at how 
international conflict has been intrinsic to the practice of the Westphalian model of 
sovereignty. 
35 Andrew Nathan, "What's Wrong with U.S. Taiwan Policy," Washington Quarterly, 23, no. 2 (2000), 
E· io3. 
6 Michael McDevitt, "The Security Situation Across the Taiwan Strait: Challenges and opportunities," 
Journal of Contemporary China, p. 416. 
37 Loa Iok-sin, 'Ma Repeats "Region-to-Region" Connnents,' Taipei Times, 22 December 2008, p. 3. 
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To begin with, though, it is worth noting that the notion of sovereignty was 
initially devised not for the purpose of creating tensions or exacerbating conflict. 
Qutie the opposite, it was first systematically introduced by Bodin in his Six Books of 
the Republic in order to find a cure to the scourge of religious conflict that had 
ravaged France. According to Bodin, law and order could only be maintained under 
the condition of sovereignty, where power was exercised by a single authority across 
the territorial jurisdiction.38 Likewise, for Thomas Hobbes, the very political purpose 
of the sovereign state is the establishment of order .39 And the Treaty .of Westphalian, 
from which Westphalian sovereignty was derived, was signed in order to settle the 
prolonged disputes in Europe. Indeed, the implication of reciprocity contained in the 
idea of sovereignty, that is, "a state which claims to be free of limit and control within 
its community is bound in logic to concede the same freedom to other states in 
theirs,"40 was designed to regulate and even stabilise international relations. As such, 
it seems that the "Westphalia model, based on the -p~in~iples of autonomy and 
territory, offers a simple, arresting, and elegant image. It orders the minds of policy-
makers." 41 
Westphalian sovereignty might well ·have usefully served to maintain both 
domestic and world order, especially when internally there is a commonly agreed 
centre of authority, such as the king, and externally, when states are divided by clearly 
demarcated, mutually agreed boundaries. Good fences make good neighbours, so the 
argument goes. But in reality these conditions are often in short supply. For instance, 
when internal sovereignty is bitterly contested by rival factions, the very concept that 
was aimed to maintain domestic order can heighten the political stake and thus 
intensify conflict. Furthermore, even if a single centre of authority can be agreed upon, 
the very notion of sovereignty 'inside' implies the existence of anarchy 'outside', and 
with anarchy comes what Hobbes called the 'state of nature'. As a consequence, he 
'saw with great clarity that achieving peace within a state does nothing to diminish 
insecurity and violence among them.'42 
Therefore, when states do not have clearly defined boundaries, the role of 
Westphalian sovereignty in ensuring international peace becomes particularly 
problematic. In many cases, states do not agree where their 'fence' should be placed, 
or whether there should be a Westphalian-style hard-edged fence between them at all. 
38 Richard Devetak, 'TI1e Modem State and Its Origins,' in Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, and Jim 
George eds., An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives, Cambridge: 
Cambride University Press, 2007, pp. 124-5. 
39 Richard Devetak and Richard Riggott, 'Justice Unbound? Globalization, States and the 
Transformation of the Social Bond.' International Affairs, 75, 3, 1999, p. 485. 
40 M. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 158. 
41 Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," p. 115. 
42 Devctak, 'TI1c Modem State and Its Origins,' p. 126. 
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Under these circumstances., far from being an instrument for peace and stability, 
competing claims to sovereignty over a particular territorial space can be a recipe for 
conflict. After all, as noted above, characteristic of the Westphalian model of 
sovereignty is a zero-sum, mutually exclusive logic. Under this exclusionist rubric, 
"state sovereignty fommlises a spatial differentiation of inside and outside, same and 
other."43 Insofar as a relationship is framed in terms of self and other, it would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find compromise and accommodation, for 
concessions on matters of sovereignty to the Other can be porjrayed as nothing less 
than a destruction of self, or simply as treason. In his book National Deconstruction, 
David Campbell's study of the Bosnia War clearly illustrates how the articulation of 
identity in terms of absolute, mutually exclusive sovereignty both led to and 
prolonged violence.44 Similarly, in his analysis of the frontier disputes between 
British India and Republican China, Hsiao-Ting Lin argues that although 'the 
professed sovereignty claimed by both Republican China and British India over the 
Assam-Tibetan tribal territory were largely imaginary, existing merely on official 
maps and political propagandas,' 'such imagined sovereignty and the 
"cartographically existing" in fact constituted the origins of a dispute that 'eventually 
led to war between the successor regimes in the 1960s. '45 
Furthermore, even if relatively stable national boundaries exist, the temptation of 
exercising absolute authority over a larger territory has often prompted great powers 
to pursue greater territorial ambition. In the mid-nineteenth century, in the name of 
demanding diplomatic equality from the Chinese government in the late Qing period, 
the British found it justifiable to wage the Opium War against China. In this sense, as 
RB.J. Walker notes, 
the principle of sovereign equality among states has always been something of a fiction. 
Inequality between states has been justified on the grounds that it allows the larger 
states to preserve "order" in the system as a whole .... Thus, the logic of the modern 
states system brings not only the promise of war between states but alsO" the ongoing 
domination of strong states over weaker ones. 46 
43 Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 73. 
44 David Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 242. 
45 Lin, Hsiao-Ting 'Boundary, sovereignty, and imagination: Reconsidering the frontier disputes 
between British India and Republican China, 1914-47', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 32, no. 3 (2004), p. 26. 
46 Walker, One World, Many Worlds, 1988, p. 37. 
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Thus, the practical consequences of the principle of sovereignty have not been 
particularly peaceful in nature. While conflict has been a human phenomenon since 
the existence of human society, the formation of the sovereign state often makes war 
and organised conflict particularly violent and intractable. This connection between 
conflict and state-building in the form of W estphalian sovereignty has been captured 
nicely by a number of observers. For Charles Tilly, "war made the state and the state 
made war."47 Similarly, Michael Howard argues that "no Nation, in the true sense of 
the word, could be born without war."48 It is obvious that by sthe true sense of the 
word,' Howard means the Westphalian sense. 
In this context, I argue that the Taiwan conundrum, while no doubt caused by a 
combination of factors, needs to be more fully understood against the background of 
the insistence on Westphalian sovereignty by both mainland China and Taiwan. To 
the extent that both sides aspire to the Westphalian model of sovereignty irt solving 
the Taiwan question, they cannot but perceive it as a zero-sum game. This perception 
is clearly evident, for example, in Taipei and Beijing's frequent dismissal of each 
other's proposed solutions. Beijing insists on the policy of "One Country, Two 
Systems" as an appropriate formula for reunification. However, while offering a more 
flexible treatment of Taiwan than Hong Kong, this formula remains wedded to 
China's claim to national sovereignty over Taiwan, and implies a hierarchical, central-
local relationship between Beijing and Taipei. Consequently, equally adamant on its 
own sovereignty aspiration, Taiwan sees it as nothing more than a ploy to deny 
Taiwan's de facto sovereignty status.49 
On the other hand, Taiwan's notion of "One Country, Two Political Entities" has 
been equally greeted with suspicion by the Chinese government on similar grounds. 
Beijing fears that the acceptance of Taiwan as an equal political entity would imply 
the loss of absolute authority for the central government, as well as the separation of 
national sovereignty. Thus, the commitment to the Westphalian model of absolute, 
indivisible sovereignty on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has proved to be an obstacle 
to progress in cross-strait relations. 
What is more, because it symbolises the supreme authority of a nation, 
Westphalian sovereignty not only is a basis for foreign policy, but also often becomes 
a sacred national goal itself. In the case of China, Taiwan's reunification with the 
mainland not merely is a sovereignty issue, but has come to symbolise China's 
47 Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State-making,' in Tilly ed., The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 42. 
48 Michael Howard, 'War and the Nation-State,' Daedalus 108, 4 (1979), p. 102. Emphasis in original. 
49 Jeremy Page, 'China d•~tails Taiwan unification offer,' Reuters, September 10, 2001. 
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sovereignty and survival per se, for which it is willing to fight at any cost. With the 
significance of the Taiwan issue elevated to such height, it seems that any other kind 
of loss or setback is no longer able to deter China from achieving this fundamental 
goal. For instance, this detennination was clearly articulated by a Chinese official, 
who had warned Taiwan not to miscalculate and declare independence before the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The official bluntly reminded that "the Olympics is not 
one of [China's] three major tasks [which the party leadership describes as 
modernization, reunification, and common development]; reunification is."50 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, whenever national sovereignty 
is believed to be at stake, the determination is almost equally strong. In this sense, as 
Kenneth Lieberthal correctly notes, both sides' "obsession with final-status issues 
('reunification' for Beijing and 'independence' for Taiwan) has made the situation 
pregnant with catastrophc."51 Such an obsession, of course, is merely a symptom of 
the ideational influence of Westphalian sovereignty. And catastrophe has indeed been 
a distinct possibility when Taiwan attempts to touch on the final-status issue. For 
example, after Lee Teng-hui announced his provocative "two-state theory" in July 
1999, Beijing sent its warplanes to the Taiwan Strait, which strayed over the centre 
line several times.52 
And to further complicate the matter, integral to the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty is the perceived legitimacy of the use of force within the claimed 
jurisdictional space. According to Max Weber, a hallmark of a sovereign state is its 
monopoly of legitimate violence within its territory. Little wonder that Beijing regards 
the use of force not only as an effective means of deterrence, but also as its 
fundamental right as a sovereign nation. Michael Swaine observes that China's refusal 
to renounce its use of force over Taiwan is predicated precisely on the claim that 'the 
ability to employ force over one's territory is an essential attribute of sovereignty."53 
Along this line of reasoning, Beijing feels that its military build-up is not only 
strategically necessary, but indeed politically justified. Still on the same basis, China 
passed its Anti-Secession Law in early 2005, in which it reserves its right to "employ 
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.';54 
Such military build-up opposite Taiwan and the threat to use force often do 
nothing but increase mutual distrust and hostility between the two sides. Many argue 
50 Andrew Peterson, "Dangerous Game across the Taiwan Strait," Washington Quarterly, p. 26 
51 Lieberthal, Kennethal, "Preventing a War Over Taiwan," 
52 June Tuefel Dreyer, "Flashpoints in the Taiwan Strait," p. 621. 
53 Michael Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," p. 
54 Anti-Secession Law, Article 8. See "Anti-Secession Law Passed by NPC," China Daily, March 14, 
2005. 
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that the 1995-96 Chinese missile tests off Taiwan's coast alienated Taiwan's citizens. 
In the lead-up to Taiwan's 2000 presidential election, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
warned that if Chen Shui-bian were elected, China might be forced to "spill blood" 
over the question of independence. 55 With the subsequent victory of the pro-
independence candidate Chen Shui-bian, Zhu's warning was widely believed to have 
contributed precisely to the opposite effect. More importantly, China's refusal to 
renounce the use of force has been met with equally belligerent responses from 
Taiwan. Taiwan's former premier Yu Shyi-kun, for example, said that Taiwan shoul<;l 
seek to deter a Chinese attack by building a "balance of terror" like that between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. it demonstrated for the first time that 
"Taiwan is seeking offensive capabilities that would enable it to launch land strikes 
against China."56 Should such spiral model continue unabated, catastrophic military 
conflict-not just between Beijing and Taipei, but also between Beijing and 
Washington-. is by no means unimaginable. For instance, as U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Robert Zoellick warned, "independence means war," which, he added, "means 
American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines."57 
Thus, the root cause of.the Taiwan problem is not military build-up per se, but 
the belief in Westphalian sovereignty. Military build-up is merely the logical 
development of such a belief. To be sure, while the mutual insistence on Westphalian 
sovereignty has contributed to mistrust and tensions across the Taiwan Strait, cross-
strait relations have so far managed to maintain a delicate status quo. But the status 
quo is a precarious one, for it satisfies neither side's ultimate goal of Westphalian 
sovereignty. In order to secure long-term stability, alternative ways of conceptualising 
sovereignty and identity are called for. 
Beyond an Exclusionist Construction of Identity and Sovereignty 
If W estphalian sovereignty is at the core of the Taiwan conundrum, a rethinking 
of this notion is a necessary step towards solving this problem. For all the appeal of 
Westphalian sovereignty as an ideal form of organising national identity, in dealing 
with the Taiwan question, both the difficulty of its full realisation and its great 
potential for military conflict should persuade us to move beyond this ideational 
straightjacket and explore feasible alternatives other than in zero-sum, absolute, and 
exclusivist terms. Positive political developments, closer economic integration, active 
55 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ asia/jan-juneO O/taiwan ~3-20.html 
56 Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Is Seeking Missiles That Could Hit China," Financial Times, 27 September 
2004, p. 5. 
57 
"US Official Says Taiwan's Independence Means War for America," Agence France Presse, May 11, 
2006. 
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cultural exchanges, and increasing confidence-building measures are certainly 
important in helping mitigate the Taiwan flashpoint, but to the extent that Chinese and 
Taiwanese conceptions of their identity continue to be modelled on the Westphalian 
notion, there would be little prospect for the emergence of a fundamental solution. 
While we should not pretend that the attempt to modify this dominant notion of 
. sovereignty will be easy, Westphalian sovereignty is not something beyond question. 
As one scholar notes, 'although the Westphalian system has endured the industrial 
revolution, the rise of mass politics, other enormous changes ·in economic and 
political systems, and revolutions in technology, culture, and communication, there is 
yet no iron logic by which it must last Westphalia is persistent, not permanent. ' 58 
Three reasons can be offered here as to why W estphalian sovereignty is not 
permanent and can be rethought. First, sovereignty is never a static concept in history. 
As Heller and Sofaer argue, 'the concept of sovereignty is not a set of established 
rules, to which states must bend their conduct in order to preserve their capacities. It is 
instead an ever-changing description of the essential authorities of states, intended to 
serve rather than control the~ in a world that states dominate.' 59 As such, 
Westphalian sovereignty can be understood as merely a historically specific social 
construct, even though it is an extremely powerful social construct. And to the extent 
that it is socially constructed rather than a law of nature, it is amenable to change. 
Second, for all its ideational dominance in the international system, Westphalian 
s.overeignty has continued to prove that it is more of an ideal than reality. As Stephen 
Krasner notes: 
the Westphalian model has never been an accurate description of many of the entities 
that have been called states .... There has never been some golden age of the 
Westphalian state. The Westphalian model has never been more than a reference point 
or a convention~ it has never been some deeply confirming structure from which actors 
could not escape. 60 
Third, partly because international reality is not totally in accordance with 
Westphalian sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty is not the sufficient nor the 
necessary precondition for states• survival, practical authority, or prosperity. On the 
one hand, though many states enjoy nominal Westphalian sovereignty, they are 
nevertheless considered weak or failed states. It is not uncommon for sovereign states 
si Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 92. 
5~ Quoted in Stephen D. Krasner, 'Problematic Sovereignty,' p. 5. 
60 Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," p. 115. 
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to be at the mercy of international institutions or great powers. On the other hand, for 
a long time, Switzerland had thrived without a membership in the United Nations. 
And Taiwan's own economic experience illustrates that the absence of Westphalian 
sovereignty is no obstacle to economic prosperity, political development, or 
international ties. 
If it is possible to modify Westphalian sovereignty, then the obvious starting 
point pertaining to Taiwan would be: how can Taiwan retain and formalise its de facto 
sovereignty by giving up de jure independence? Or how can China achieve formal 
unification while allowing the continuation of Taiwan's de facto independence? In 
short, how can we make the concept of sovereignty less rigidly Westphalian and more 
eclectic and flexible? Obviously, there will be no easy answer to these difficult 
questions. Nevertheless, purely for the sake of indicating the possibility of moving 
beyond the W estphalian model and provoking further debate, here I tentatively offer a 
particular fonnula of sovereignty, which I call a hybrid model of sovereignty. 
This hybrid sovereignty consists of two interlocked forms of sovereignty. 
Horizontally, it retains two territorially divided domains of empirical or practical 
sovereignty, with mainland China and Taiwan continuing to exercise authority over 
their respective territory. But vertically, these two separated domains of practical 
sovereignty are integrated into one higher form. of sovereignty, which may be 
regarded as popular or cultural sovereignty in ethnic and/or cultural terms, if not in 
political or administrative sense. 
Through the horizontal division, Taiwan's ·de facto sovereignty remains intact, 
which is designed to satisfy the bottom line of Taiwan. On the other hand, by way of 
vertical integration, the two political entities are unified as one China in a de jure 
sense, and Taiwan's de Jure independence is ruled out. In doing so, mainland China's 
minimum demand for one China is met. But this differs from the conventional 
Chinese sovereignty claim in a significant way. That is, this sovereignty belongs to 
the whole Chinese nation, rather than to the government of the People's Republic. In 
other words, this sovereignty is shared by both the mainland and Taiwan, but under 
the political control of neither side. In this sense, such sovereignty is a form of virtual 
or symbolic sovereignty, which lacks a single political centre or authority. 
Nevertheless, insofar as the sovereignty of "Great China" (incorporating mainland 
China and Taiwan) is recognised by the international community, it represents the de 
jure unification of one Chinese nation. Any alteration of this sovereignty status would 
require the consent of the majority of the Chinese people, defined as including people 
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is a necessary reflection of one important 
dimension of the current status quo, namely, the existence of one Chinese nation. 
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While the notion of "one China" is often subject to different interpretations, both sides 
do accept the reality of one Chinese people. Therefore, this vertical sovereignty 
reflects this important consensus and provides it with a formal legal framework. 
Clearly, this arrangement of sovereignty is different from the Westphalian form 
of hierarchical sovereign structure with one single supreme authority. First, as far as 
vertical sovereignty is concerned, the lack of a single higher authority above either 
Beijing or Taipei would be inconceivable for Westphalian sovereignty. Second, 
neither Beijing or Taipei are completely sovereign in the Westphalian sense. Their co-
existence as two separate practical sovereign entities does not make cross-strait 
relations an international relationship. For Westphalian sovereignty, this is again 
unimaginable for two practically sovereign entities to accept the existence of a still 
higher, albeit largely symbolic authority. 
Greg Austin argued that in solving the Taiwan question, two "existing realities" 
need to be recognised. The first is that "Taiwan and China must remain linked by a 
common sovereignty"; and the second is that "Taiwan has emerged as a vibrant and 
highly capable self-governing community without ever having been ruled by the 
Chinese Communist Party." 61 Together, these two existing realities make up the 
current status quo, with which both sides more or less agree. In effect, this hybrid 
sovereignty arrangement is not a radical plan, but grounded in this dual existing 
political reality across the Taiwan Strait, or the status quo. At the same time, by 
institutionalising the currently mutually accepted but fragile status quo, this formula 
provides more institutional and legal certainty than does the current fragile status quo. 
But this hybrid sovereignty is. not a simple institutionalisation of the status quo. It 
is flexible enough to allow more positive development. For example, while ruling out 
Beijing's worst political nightmare (i.e., Taiwan's formal independence), this formula 
does not preclude the possibility of further integration between· the two political 
entities should the two sides wish to do so in the future. Meanwhile, under this 
formula, Taiwan's de facto sovereignty would receive formal recognition from 
Beijing and the international community. Although such recognition would be limited 
within the "one C~ina" framework, it would provide Taiwan with the international 
space and legitimacy it both needs and often deserves, but something which has so far 
largely eluded this island. 
It must be acknowledged here that this hybrid model of sovereignty is not a 
completely new idea. In many ways, it bears resemblance to Taiwan's former 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Yung Wei's concept of "multi-system 
nations." This concept, he argued, could "preserve the idea of 'one [Chinese] nation' 
61 Greg Austin, "China's Perceptions of Cross-Strait Relations," p. 22. 
19 
but face the reality of the co-existence of hvo or more mutually separated political 
systems within that nation."62 This is a very important concept as it opens the way for 
the formulas such as "one nation~ two systems," "one sovereignty, two jurisdictions" 
and "one country, two international personalities."63 What is new to the hybrid model 
of sovereignty is that it is based on a more conscious critique of the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have outlined the necessity and possibility of rethinking the 
Westphalian model of sovereignty in relation to the Taiwan question. The paper has 
examined how the notion of Westphalian sovereignty has dominated the thinking of 
both mainland China and Taiwan in dealing with the Taiwan question, and how this 
notion has been prone to conflict in international practice. In the case of Taiwan, it has 
been illustrated that Westphalian sovereignty, by framing it as a zero-sum game, has 
often rendered compromise extremely difficult, and fuelled distrust 'tlld deepened 
animosity. On this basis, the paper tentatively proposes a hybrid model of sovereignty, 
with a vertical sovereignty addressing the issue of "one China," and a horizontal 
sovereignty arrangement accommodating Taiwan's need for more formal recognition 
of its de facto sovereignty. This hybrid model is an attempt to recognise and 
institutionalise the status quo in cross-strait relations, and therefore, it could become a 
. useful starting point for reconciliation and mutual accommodation. 
This, of course, does not mean that this hybrid formula provides an easy solution 
to the perplexing Taiwan challenge. In practice, this formula may face many 
challenges of its own such as the issue of international representation, the concern 
with future 'cheating' or 'defection' by either or both sides, the implications for 
China's minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as U.S. reactions. And 
above all, if the insistence on sovereignty is at the heart of the confrontation between 
mainland China and Taiwan, then a direct challenge to this Westphalian concept 
would by definition face intense resistance from both sides. And too often, we have 
witnessed that seemingly workable proposals are carefully put forward, only to be 
dismissed out of hand by either or both sides. 
That said, this sad reality ought to provide no excuse for pessimism or inaction 
on the part of scholars and policy-makers, not least because the stakes are so high. 
Neither side actually wants a war. A military conflict would be in no one's interests, 
62 Yung Wei, "From F1mctional Integration to Structural Readjustment," Journal of Contemporary 
China, p. 434. · · 
63 Ibid, p. 435. 
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including those of the U.S .. , and both sides of the Taiwan Strait seem to acutely 
understand that. As Thomas Christensen points out, "Beijing may be willing to fight 
over Taiwan even against militarily superior foes, but it is hardly eager to do so. "64 
Perhaps for this reason, despite their official insistence.on Westphalian sovereignty, in 
practice both Beijing and Taipei have demonstrated some pragmatism and flexibility. 
At one level, Beijing is increasingly accommodating to the prospect of maintaining 
Taiwan's de facto sovereignty within a 'one China' framework. China has promised 
that it would neither levy taxes or appoint mainland official on Taiwan, and that 
Taiwan could keep its own currency, military, customs status and government 
structure. 65 This is in effect Beijing's acknowledgement of Taiwan's practical 
sovereignty. Asked if China would be willing to accept a loose confederation with 
Taiwan, something China had ruled out before, Qian Qichen replied that "Anything 
can be discussed." He went on to say that China had adopted a "pragmatic and more 
inclusive" version of its long-standing one-China policy. 66 In 2005, meeting with 
James Soong, Chinese President Hu Jintao effectively agreed to open talks if Taiwan 
accepted the principle of "two shores, one China" while acknowledging that the two 
sides might differ on precisely what that term meant.67 At another level, with some 
exceptions, Taiwan has not openly embraced the path towards formal independence. 
While the DPP rejected the 1992 consensus of 'one China, different interpretations,' 
the Ma Ying-jeou administration is more warm to this idea. All this, it seems, 
provides some causes for guarded optimism. 
64 Thomas Christensen, "Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," p. 12 
65 Jeremy Page, 'China details Taiwan unification offer,' Reuters, September 10, 2001. 
66 John Pomfret, "Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan," Washington Post, January 
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67 Philip P. Pan, "China Alters Language on Taiwan; Beijing Amends 'One China' Edict," Washington 
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